Why Train Collisions Occur Despite Ongoing Efforts to Stop Errant Trains in Their Tracks Before Disaster Strikes

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By Alan Kandel

In the wake of yesterday’s horrific collision involving a passenger train (Metrolink’s Train #111 northbound) and a freight (Union Pacific Train #8485 East), a train heading geographically southbound, my heart goes out to the victims, their friends and families and all others who now have sorrow in their hearts as a result of this tragedy. Incident details and casualty updates are pouring in as this is being written. Meanwhile, there will be much speculation over why or how this crash occurred until a thorough investigation is conducted and a statement documenting the contributing factors in this incident, which is likely months away, is released by the National Transportation Safety Board.

Many are probably wondering what went wrong and why these mishaps happen at all and, in light of yesterday’s devastating crash and like crashes that have happened in times past, why steps at ending these types of collisions aren’t weighted more heavily and, as such, why greater emphasis, importance and priority isn’t placed upon finding preventative solutions. Please take heart in knowing work is ongoing.

These so-called collision-avoidance systems are in use on several U.S. railroad corridors. These in no particular order are: the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) in use on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor between Boston and New Haven, Connecticut (and elsewhere); the Electronic Train Management System (ETMS); the Incremental Train Control System in service on an Amtrak corridor between Niles and Kalamazoo, Michigan; as well as the oldest one of all, the Automatic Train Stop (ATS) system. (Their more detailed descriptions appear in the latter part of this article). Time is likely a main delimiting factor as to why these technologies aren’t implemented on all mainline railroad corridors throughout the country. But as railroad technology author Rob Johnston in the November 2005 Trains magazine wrote, “Blazing new technological trails takes time and money.”

It’s also important to understand railroading today is the safest of all modes of American transportation and, “train accidents are at one of their lowest levels ever, and railroads -- which carry more ton-miles of freight than any other mode -- have a fatality rate less than one-third that of the trucking industry. Just over the past decade, train accidents have declined by 51%, fatalities are down by 22%, and 18% fewer injuries occurred,” was the claim in a March 1993 Railway Age magazine article (p. 53). It’s quite ironic, if not coincidental, that shortly after this information and statistics were released, one of the worst collisions in the history of American railroading took place.

On November 11 that year, two freight trains collided head-on just south of Kelso, Wash. This disastrous crash, which claimed the lives of all five crewmembers, presumably prompted both the then Burlington Northern and Union Pacific railroads to conduct extensive tests utilizing a technology known as Positive Train Control Separation -- an absolute train separation system.

Giving his explanation as to why railroads have yet to implement PTCS, then United Transportation Union spokesperson, Frank Wilner said it’s due to the railroads not wanting to allocate the money. Said former National Transportation Safety Board chair James E. Hall, "[T]he NTSB understands the reluctance of the railroad industry to invest the money required to implement PTCS control systems on all mainline tracks nationwide. This is a large investment to make purely in the name of safety, when all business must be concerned with the bottom line."

Information from the NTSB revealed, “[T]he current pace of development and implementation of collision avoidance technologies is inadequate. No plan for industrywide integration has been developed. Progress has been particularly slow along rail lines that primarily serve freight carriers, and even those lines with significant passenger traffic remain largely unprotected today -- some 12 years after positive train control was first placed on the Safety Board’s Most Wanted list.”

Teena Poler is the widow of one of the engineers killed in that ‘93 head-on.

In her letter to federal rail officials Poler vehemently protested: "these types of tragedies are still occurring. It is such a senseless waste of life. Someone must step forward and say, 'No More!'" What’s more she requested, if not outright demanded, railroads implement PTCS on all U.S. mainline trackage.

Athough disconcerting, what might sound surprizing, perhaps even dumbfounding, is that on the very stretch of track on which Mark Poler and the four other locomotive crewmembers who lost their lives in that ‘93 crash, on November 15, 2003, barely ten years later, a sideswipe or broadside collision between UP and Burlington Northern Santa Fe freight trains resulted in serious bodily injury to both members of the two-person UP train crew.

According to the NTSB, “Over the last three decades, the Safety Board has investigated a long list of collision accidents in which a positive train control system that incorporated collision avoidance could have prevented train collisions.” PTCS recommendations have been issued by the NTSB since 1969.

Perhaps the most promising news is the action the Federal Railroad Administration was expected to have taken. It is my understanding that based on available information I had at the time, in 2004, the FRA supposedly issued a ruling that provided for "standards for safety and compatibility for PTCS systems." NTSB officials, in anticipation of the ruling, deemed it "an important step forward.” Meanwhile in 2003, the FRA and NTSB made plans to host a symposium, whereby rail officials were expected to have addressed problems with Positive Train Control Separation and identify and to have offered proposed solutions to those problems.

In addition, the NTSB through its investigations has determined that due to distractions, fatigue, sleeping disorders and use of medications -- any of which can contribute to the failure of crewmembers to perform effectively -- necessitates PTCS systems. Speaking to this NTSB Chair Ellen G. Engleman said, “The technology these systems provide are the best approach to reducing human error collision.” These systems can stop a train when crewmember operating rule failure (violation) occurs.

The Federal Railroad Administration provides the following information regarding Positive Train Control (PTC), Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES), and Incremental Train Control System (ITCS) technologies.

North American Joint Positive Train Control

On January 23, 1998, FRA joined with the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and the State of Illinois to begin development of a high-speed PTC project for the St. Louis-Chicago corridor. Industry efforts toward PTC have now been integrated into the North American Joint PTC Program. AAR is contributing $20 million and providing project management through Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI). The Illinois Department of Transportation is providing over $12 million and FRA is providing over $28 million as part of the Next Generation High Speed Rail Program (NGHSR). With funds in the FY 2002 appropriation, the $60 million project total estimate is now fully funded. Lockheed Martin, the System Development/Integration contractor, and program participants are completing a critical design review. The project is on schedule for targeted system operation by the end of 2002. FRA is working with the project team regarding necessary safety approvals. This project is also the venue for the industry's development of standards for PTC interoperability (i.e., the ability of a train to move from one railroad or from one type of train control system onto another at track speed while under continuous supervision of the train control systems).

ACSES. Amtrak has implemented the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) on the Northeast Corridor (NEC) between Boston and New Haven and in high-speed territory south of New York City. ACSES supplements the existing cab signal/automatic train control system on the NEC, providing full PTC functionality in support of operations up to 150 mph. In late 2001, New Jersey Transit began progressive implementation of an ACSES-compatible system on its property by activating the system on an initial line segment.

ITCS. FRA joined with Amtrak and the State of Michigan to install an Incremental Train Control System (ITCS), which is being cut in on Amtrak's Michigan line. This project includes high-speed highway-rail crossing signal starts and integration of remote health monitoring for crossing signals (so that the train is slowed if proper warning will not be provided). On April 18, 2001, Amtrak cut in ITCS for revenue service. On January 7, 2002, the maximum train speed increased from 79 mph to 90 mph in this territory. ITCS is designed to ultimately support operations to
110 mph.

(Sources: “Safety hazards still haunt tracks,” by Tony Lystra, The Longview Daily News (Wash.), Nov 23, 2003; “NTSB Cites BNSF Crew’s Inattentiveness in Metrolink, BNSF Accident in 2002,” NTSB Press Release, October 7, 2003; “Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements: Positive Train Control Systems,” NTSB’s ‘Most Wanted’ list; “Positive Train Control Overview,” FRA).

Alan Kandel is a concerned California resident advocating for new, improved and expanded freight (and passenger) rail service. He is a retired railroad signalman previously employed by the Union Pacific Railroad in Fremont, California.